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Abstract
The k-set agreement problem is a generalization of the consensus problem: considering a
system made up of n processes where each process proposes a value, each non-faulty process has
to decide a value such that a decided value is a proposed value, and no more than k dierent
values are decided. It has recently be shown that, in the crash failure model, min(b
f
k
c+2; b
t
k
c+1)
is a lower bound on the number of rounds for the non-faulty processes to decide (where t is an
upper bound on the number of process crashes, and f , 0  f  t, the actual number of crashes).
This paper considers the k-set agreement problem in synchronous systems where up to
t < n=2 processes can experience general omission failures (i.e., a process can crash or omit
sending or receiving messages). It rst introduces a new property, called strong termination.
This property is on the processes that decide. It is satised if, not only every non-faulty
process, but any process that neither crashes nor commits receive omission failure decides.The
paper then presents a k-set agreement protocol that enjoys the following features. First, it
is strongly terminating (to our knowledge, it is the rst agreement protocol to satisfy this
property, whatever the failure model considered). Then, it is early deciding and stopping in the
sense that a process that either is non-faulty or commits only send omission failures decides
and halts by round min(b
f
k
c + 2; b
t
k
c + 1). To our knowledge, this is the rst early deciding
k-set agreement protocol for the general omission failure model. Moreover, the protocol provides
also the following additional early stopping property: a process that commits receive omission
failures (and does not crash) executes at most min(d
f
k
e+2; b
t
k
c+1) rounds. It is worth noticing
that the protocol allows each property (strong termination vs early deciding/stopping vs early
stopping) not to be obtained at the detriment of the two others.
The combination of the fact that min(b
f
k
c + 2; b
t
k
c + 1) is lower bound on the number of
rounds in the crash failure model, and the very existence of the proposed protocol has two note-
worthy consequences. First, it shows that, although the general omission failure model is more
severe than the crash failure model, both models have the same lower bound for the non-faulty
processes to decide. Second, it shows that, in the general omission failure model, that bound
applies also the processes that do not crash and commit only send omission failures.
Keywords: Agreement problem, Crash failure, Strong Termination, Early decision, Early
stopping, Eciency, k-set agreement, Message-passing system, Receive omission failure, Round-
based computation, Send omission failure, Synchronous system.

An extended abstract of a rst version (15 pages) of this paper has appeared in the proceedings of SIROCCO
2006 [29].
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1 Introduction
Context of the paper k-set and consensus problems. The k-set agreement problem generalizes
the uniform consensus problem (that corresponds to the case k = 1). It has been introduced by
S. Chaudhuri who, considering the crash failure model, investigated how the number of choices (k)
allowed to the processes is related to the maximum number (t) of processes that can be faulty (i.e.,
that can crash) [7]. The problem can be dened as follows. Each of the n processes (processors)
dening the system starts with its own value (called \proposed value"). Each process that does not
crash has to decide a value (termination), in such a way that a decided value is a proposed value
(validity) and no more than k dierent values are decided (agreement)
1
.
k-set agreement can trivially be solved in crash-prone asynchronous systems when k > t [7]. A
one communication step protocol is as follows: (1) t+ 1 processes are arbitrarily selected prior to
the execution; (2) each of these processes sends its value to all processes; (3) a process decides the
rst value it receives. Dierently, it has been shown that there is no solution in these systems as
soon as k  t [5, 17, 32]. (The asynchronous consensus impossibility, case k = 1, was demonstrated
before, using a dierent technique [11]. A combinatorial characterization of the tasks which are
solvable in presence of one process crash is presented in [3]). Several approaches have been pro-
posed to circumvent the impossibility to solve the k-set agreement problem in process crash prone
asynchronous systems (e.g., probabilistic protocols [22], or unreliable failure detectors with limited
scope accuracy [16, 21, 33]).
The situation is dierent in process crash prone synchronous systems where the k-set agreement
problem can always be solved, whatever the value of t with respect to k. It has also been shown
that, in the worst case, the lower bound on the number of rounds (time complexity measured in
communication steps) is bt=kc + 1 [8]. (This bound generalizes the t + 1 lower bound associated
with the consensus problem [1, 2, 10, 20]. See also [4] for the case t = 1.)
Early decision. Although failures do occur, they are rare in practice. For the uniform consensus
problem (k = 1), this observation has motivated the design of early deciding synchronous protocols
[6, 9, 19, 30], i.e., protocols that can cope with up to t process crashes, but decide in less than t+1
rounds in favorable circumstances (i.e., when there are few failures). More precisely, these protocols
allow the processes to decide in min(f + 2; t + 1) rounds, where f is the number of processes that
crash during a run, 0  f  t, which has been shown to be optimal (the worst scenario being when
there is exactly one crash per round) [6, 18]
2
.
In a very interesting way, it has very recently been shown that the early deciding lower bound
for the k-set agreement problem in the synchronous crash failure model is bf=kc+2 for 0  bf=kc 
bt=kc   2, and bf=kc+ 1 otherwise [12]. This lower bound, not only generalizes the corresponding
uniform consensus lower bound, but also shows an \inescapable tradeo" among the number t
of crashes tolerated, the number f of actual crashes, the degree k of coordination we want to
achieve, and the best running time achievable [8]. As far as the time/coordination degree tradeo
is concerned, it is important to notice that, when compared to consensus, k-set agreement divides
the running time by k (e.g., allowing two values to be decided halves the running time).
1
A process that decides and thereafter crashes is not allowed to decide one more value, in addition to the k allowed
values. This is why k-set agreement generalizes uniform consensus where no two processes (be they faulty or not)
can decide dierent values. Non-uniform consensus allows a faulty process to decide a value dierent from the value
decided by the correct processes. The non-uniform version of the k-set agreement problem has not been investigated
in the literature.
2
More precisely, the lower bound is f + 2 when f  t  2, and f + 1 when f = t  1 or f = t.
2
Related work While not-early deciding k-set agreement protocols for the synchronous crash
failure model (i.e., protocols that always terminate in bt=kc + 1 rounds) are now well understood
[2, 8, 20], to our knowledge, so far only two early deciding k-set agreement protocols have been
proposed [13, 27] for that model. The protocol described in [13] assumes t < n k, which means that
the number of crashes t that can be tolerated decreases as the coordination degree k increases. The
protocol described in [27], which imposes no constraint on t (i.e., t < n), is based on a mechanism
that allows the processes to take into account the actual pattern of crash failures and not only
their number, thereby allowing the processes to decide in much less than bf=kc+2 rounds in a lot
of cases (the worst case being only when the crashes are evenly distributed in the rounds with k
crashes per round). We have recently designed an early deciding k-set agreement protocol for the
synchronous send (only) omission failure model [28]. A survey of the k-set agreement problem in
synchronous systems prone to crash, send omission or general omission failures is presented in [31].
Content of the paper This paper investigates the k-set agreement problem in synchronous
systems prone to general omission failures and presents a k-set protocol suited to this model.
This failure model lies between the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model [24]: a
faulty process is a process that crashes, or omits sending or receiving messages [14, 25]. This
failure model is particularly interesting as it provides the system designers with a realistic way to
represent overow failures of the output buers (send omission failures) or input buers (receive
omission failures) of at most t processes [14, 25]. The proposed protocol enjoys several noteworthy
properties.
 The usual termination property used to dene an agreement problem concerns only the correct
processes: they all have to decide. This requirement is tied to the problem, independently of
a particular model. Due to the very nature of the corresponding faults, there is no way to
force a faulty process to decide in the crash failure model. It is the same in the Byzantine
failure model where a faulty process that does not crash can decide an arbitrary value.
The situation is dierent in the general omission failure model where a faulty process that
does not crash cannot have an arbitrary behavior. On one side, due to the very nature of
the receive omission failures committed by a process, there are runs where that process can
forever be prevented from learning that it can decide a value without violating the agreement
property (at most k dierent values are decided)
3
. So, for such a process, the best that can
be done in the general case is either to decide a (correct) value, or halt without deciding
because it does not know whether it has a value that can be decided. On the other side,
a process that commits only send omission failures receives all the messages sent to it, and
should consequently be able to always decide a correct value.
We say that a protocol is strongly terminating if it forces to decide all the processes that
neither crash nor commit receive omission failures(we call them the good processes; the other
processes are called bad processes). This new termination criterion is both theoretically
and practically relevant: it extends the termination property to all the processes that are
committing only \benign" faults. The proposed protocol is strongly terminating
4
.
 Although, as discussed before, early decision be an interesting property, some early-deciding
(consensus) protocols make a dierence between early decision and early stopping: they allow
3
A process that commits receive omission failures, has an \autism" behavior. If it receives no message, it is isolated
from the other processes and cannot learn values from its environment.
4
None of the uniform consensus protocols for the synchronous general omission failure model that we are aware
of (e.g., [25, 26]) is strongly terminating.
3
a correct process to decide in min(f +2; t+1) but stop only at a later round (e.g., [9]). Here
we are interested in early-deciding protocols in which a process decides and stops during the
very same round. More precisely, the proposed protocol has the following property:
- A good process decides and halts by round min(b
f
k
c+ 2; b
t
k
c+ 1).
So, when b
f
k
c  b
t
k
c   2, the protocol has the noteworthy property to extend the b
f
k
c + 2
lower bound for a correct process to decide (1) from the crash failure model to the general
omission failure model, and (2) from the correct processes to all the good processes.
As noticed before, it is not possible to force a bad process to decide. So, for these processes
the protocol \does its best", namely it ensures the following early stopping property:
- No process executes more than min(d
f
k
e+ 2; b
t
k
c+ 1) rounds.
Let us notice that it is possible that a bad process decides just before halting. Moreover,
when f = x k where x is an integer (which is always the case for consensus), or when there
is no fault (f = 0), a bad process executes no more rounds than a good process. In the other
cases, it executes at most one additional round.
 Each message carries a proposed value and two boolean arrays of size n (sets of process
identities). This means that, if we do not consider the size of the proposed values (that does
not depends on the protocol), the bit complexity is upper bounded by O(n
2
f=k) per process.
The design of a protocol that satises, simultaneously and despite process crashes and general
omission faults, the agreement property of the k-set problem, strong termination, early decision
and stopping for the good processes and early stopping for the bad processes is not entirely obvious,
as these properties are partly antagonistic. This is due to the fact that agreement requires that no
more than k distinct values be decided (be the deciding processes correct or not), strong termination
requires that, in addition to the correct processes, a well dened class of faulty processes decide, and
early stopping requires the processes to halt as soon as possible. Consequently the protocol should
not prevent processes from deciding at dierent rounds, and so, after it has decided, a process can
appear to the other processes as committing omission failures, while it is actually correct. Finally,
the strong termination property prevents the elimination from the protocol of a faulty process that
commits only send omission failures as soon as it has been discovered faulty, as that process has to
decide a value if it does not crash later. A major diculty in the design of the protocol consists in
obtaining simultaneously all these properties and not each one at the price of not satisfying one of
the others.
General transformations from a synchronous failure model to another synchronous failure model
(e.g., from omission to crash) are presented in [23]. These transformations are general (they are
not associated with particular problems) and have a cost (simulating a round in the crash failure
model requires two rounds in the more severe omission failure model). So, they are not relevant
for our purpose.
When instantiated with k = 1, the protocol provides a new uniform consensus protocol for
the synchronous general omission failure model. To our knowledge, this is the rst uniform con-
sensus protocol that enjoys strong termination and directs all the processes to terminate by round
min(f+2; t+1). Let us nally observe that the paper leaves open two problems for future research.
The rst consists in proving or disproving that d
f
k
e+ 2 is a tight lower bound for a bad process to
stop when f = k x + y with x and y being integers and 0 < y < k (we think it is). The second
problem concerns t: is t < n=2 a lower bound to solve the strongly terminating early stopping k-set
problem? (Let us remark that the answer is \yes" for k = 1 [23, 30].)
4
A k-set protocol can be useful to allocate shared resources. As an example, let us consider the
allocation of broadcast frequencies in communication networks (this example is taken from [20]).
Such a protocol allows processes to agree on a small number of frequencies for broadcasting large
data (e.g., a movie). As the communication is broadcast-based, the processes can receive the data
using the same frequency.
Roadmap The paper consists of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model and gives
a denition of the k-set agreement problem. To underline its basic design principles and make its
understanding easier, the protocol is presented incrementally. Section 3 presents rst a strongly
terminating k-set agreement protocol. Then, Section 5 enriches this basic protocol to obtain an
strongly terminating, early stopping k-set agreement protocol. Formal statements of the properties
(lemmas and theorems) of both protocols are provided in Section 4 and Section 6, respectively. The
proofs of the protocols are also done incrementally.
2 Computation Model and Strongly Terminating k-Set Agree-
ment
2.1 Round-Based Synchronous System
The system model consists of a nite set of processes, namely,  = fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g, that communicate
and synchronize by sending and receiving messages through channels. Every pair of processes p
i
and
p
j
is connected by a channel denoted (p
i
; p
j
). The underlying communication system is assumed
to be failure-free: there is no creation, alteration, loss or duplication of message.
The system is synchronous. This means that each of its executions consists of a sequence of
rounds. Those are identied by the successive integers 1; 2; etc. For the processes, the current
round number appears as a global variable r that they can read, and whose progress is managed
by the underlying system. A round is made up of three consecutive phases:
 A send phase in which each process sends messages.
 A receive phase in which each process receives messages. The fundamental property of the
synchronous model lies in the fact that a message sent by a process p
i
to a process p
j
at round
r, is received by p
j
at the same round r.
 A computation phase during which each process processes the messages it received during
that round and executes local computation.
2.2 Process Failure Model
A process is faulty during an execution if its behavior deviates from that prescribed by its algorithm,
otherwise it is correct. A failure model denes how a faulty process can deviate from its algorithm
[15]. We consider here the following failure models:
 Crash failure. A faulty process stops its execution prematurely. After it has crashed, a process
does nothing. Let us observe that if a process crashes in the middle of a sending phase, only
a subset of the messages it was supposed to send might actually be sent.
 Send Omission failure. A faulty process crashes or omits sending messages it was supposed to
send [14].
5
 General Omission failure. A faulty process crashes, omits sending messages it was supposed
to send or omits receiving messages it was supposed to receive (receive omission) [25].
It is easy to see that these failure models are of increasing \severity" in the sense that any
protocol that solves a problem in the General Omission (resp., Send Omission) failure model, also
solves it in the (less severe) Send Omission (resp., Crash) failure model [15]. This paper considers
the General Omission failure model. As already indicated, n; t and f denote the total number of
processes, the maximum number of processes that can be faulty, and the actual number of processes
that are faulty in a given run, respectively (0  f  t < n=2).
As dened in the introduction, a good process is a process that neither crashes nor commits
receive omission failures. A bad process is a process that commits receive omission failures or
crashes. So, given a run, each process is either good or bad. A good process commits only \benign"
failures, while a bad process commits \severe" failures.
2.3 Strongly Terminating k-Set Agreement
The problem has been informally stated in the Introduction: every process p
i
proposes a value v
i
and each correct process has to decide on a value in relation to the set of proposed values. More
precisely, the k-set agreement problem is dened by the following three properties:
 Termination: Every correct process decides.
 Validity: If a process decides v, then v was proposed by some process.
 Agreement: No more than k dierent values are decided.
As we have seen 1-set agreement is the uniform consensus problem. In the following, we implic-
itly assume k  t (this is because, as we have seen in the introduction, k-set agreement is trivial
when k > t).
As already mentioned, we are interested here in protocols that direct all the good processes to
decide. So, we consider a stronger version of the k-set agreement problem, in which the termination
property is replaced by the following property:
 Strong Termination: Every good process decides.
3 A Strongly Terminating k-Set Agreement Protocol
We rst present a strongly terminating k-set agreement protocol where the good processes terminate
in b
t
k
c + 1 rounds. The protocol is described in Figure 1. r is a global variable that denes the
current round number; the processes can only read it.
A process p
i
starts the protocol by invoking the function k-set agreement(v
i
) where v
i
is the
value it proposes. It terminates either by crashing, by returning the default value ? at line 08, or
by returning a proposed value at line 11. As we will see, only a bad process can exit at line 08
and return ?. That default value cannot be proposed by a process. So, returning ? means \no
decision" from the k-set agreement point of view.
3.1 Local Variables
A process p
i
manages four local variables. The scope of the rst two is the whole execution, while
the scope of the last two is limited to each round. Their meaning is the following:
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 est
i
is p
i
's current estimate of the decision value. It is initial value is v
i
(line 01).
 trusted
i
represents the set of processes that p
i
currently considers as being correct. It initial
value is  (the whole set of processes). So, i 2 trusted
i
(line 04) means that p
i
considers it
is correct. If j 2 trusted
i
we say \p
i
trusts p
j
"; if j =2 trusted
i
we say \p
i
suspects p
j
".
 rec from
i
is a round local variable used to contain the ids of the processes that p
i
does not
currently suspect and from which it has received messages during that round (line 05).
 W
i
(j) is a set of processes identities that represents the set of the processes p
`
that are
currently trusted by p
i
and that (to p
i
's knowledge) trust p
j
(line 06).
3.2 Process Behavior
The aim is for a process to decide the smallest value it has seen. But, due to the send and receive
omission failures possibly committed by some processes, a process cannot safely decide the smallest
value it has ever seen, it can only safely decide the smallest in a subset of the values it has received
during the rounds. The crucial part of the protocol consists in providing each process with correct
rules that allow it to determine its \safe subset".
Function k-set agreement(v
i
)
(01) est
i
 v
i
; trusted
i
 ; % r = 0 %
(02) for r = 1; : : : ; b
t
k
c+ 1 do
(03) begin round
(04) if (i 2 trusted
i
) then foreach j 2  do send(est
i
; trusted
i
) to p
j
enddo endif ;
(05) let rec from
i
= fj : (est
j
; trust
j
) is received from p
j
during r ^ j 2 trusted
i
g;
(06) foreach j 2 rec from
i
let W
i
(j) = f` : ` 2 rec from
i
^ j 2 trust
`
g;
(07) trusted
i
 rec from
i
 

j : jW
i
(j)j < n  t
	
;
(08) if (jtrusted
i
j < n  t) then return (?) endif ;
(09) est
i
 min(est
j
received during r and such that j 2 trusted
i
)
(10) end round;
(11) return (est
i
)
Figure 1: Strongly terminating k-set protocol for general omission failures, code for p
i
, t <
n
2
During each round r, these rules are implemented by the following process behavior decomposed
in three parts according to the synchronous round-based computation model.
 If p
i
considers it is correct (i 2 trusted
i
), it rst sends to all the processes its current local
state, namely, the current pair (est
i
; trusted
i
) (line 04). Otherwise, p
i
skips the sending phase.
 Then, p
i
executes the receive phase (line 05). As already indicated, when it considers the
messages it has received during the current round, p
i
considers only the messages sent by the
the processes it trusts (here, the set trusted
i
can be seen as a lter).
 Finally, p
i
executes the local computation phase that is the core of the protocol (lines 06-09).
This phase is made up of the following statements where the value n t constitutes a threshold
that plays a fundamental role.
{ First, p
i
determines the new value of trusted
i
(lines 06-07). It is equal to the current
set rec from
i
from which are suppressed all the processes p
j
such that jW
i
(j)j < n  t.
These processes p
j
are no longer trusted by p
i
because there are \not enough" processes
7
trusted by p
i
that trust them (p
j
is missing \Witnesses" to remain trusted by p
i
, hence
the name W
i
(j)); \not enough" means here less than n  t.
{ Then, p
i
checks if it trusts enough processes, i.e., at least n  t (line 08). If the answer
is negative, as we will see in the proof, p
i
knows that it has committed receive omission
failures and cannot safely decide. It consequently halts, returning the default value ?.
{ Finally, if it has not stopped at line 08, p
i
computes its new estimate of the decision
value (line 09) according to the estimate values it has received from the processes it
currently trusts.
4 Proof of the Strongly Terminating Protocol
The protocol proof assumes t < n=2. It uses the following notations.
 Given a set of process identities X = fi; j; : : : g, we sometimes use p
i
2 X for i 2 X.
 C is the set of correct processes in a given execution.
 x
i
[r] denotes the value of p
i
's local variable x at the end of round r.
By denition trusted
i
[0] = . When j 2 trusted
i
, we say that \p
i
trusts p
j
" (or \p
j
is trusted
by p
i
").
 Completing [r] = fi : p
i
proceeds to r+1 g. By denition Completing[0] = . (If r = b
t
k
c+1,
\p
i
proceeds to r + 1" means p
i
executes line 11.)
 EST [r] = fest
i
[r] : i 2 Completing [r]g. By denition EST [0] = the proposed values.
EST [r] contains the values that are present in the system at the end of round r.
 Silent[r] = fi : 8j 2 Completing[r] : i =2 trusted
j
[r]g. It is important to remark that if
i 2 Silent[r], then no process p
j
(including p
i
itself) takes into account est
i
sent by p
i
(if any)
to update its local variables est
j
at line 09 of the round r. (Silent[0] = ;.)
The proof of the following relations are left to the reader:
Completing[r + 1]  Completing[r];
Silent[r]  Silent[r + 1];
8i 2 Completing[r] : Silent[r]    trusted
i
[r]:
4.1 Basic Lemmas
The rst lemma that follows will be used to prove that a process that does not commit receive
omission failure decides.
Lemma 1 Let p
i
be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We have 8r :
(1) C  trusted
i
[r] and (2) i 2 Completing[r].
Proof The proof is by induction on the round number r. Let p
i
be a process that is correct or
commits only send omission failures.
8
 Base case. Let us rst observe that we have initially 8j : trusted
j
[0] = . The set
rec from
i
[1] computed by p
i
at line 05 of the rst round includes all the processes that did
not commit send omission failure: it consequently includes (at least) all the correct processes,
i.e., at least n  t processes.
Let us consider any correct process p
j
. That process is such that j 2 trust
`
, for any p
l
from
which p
i
receives a message, because trust
`
carries the value trusted
`
[0] which is equal to .
As there are at least n  t correct processes, it follows that the set W
i
(j) (computed at line
06) contains at least n  t processes. We can then conclude that all the correct processes p
j
belong to rec from
i
[1] and none of them is suppressed from it when the value trusted
i
[1] is
computed at line 07. It follows that jtrusted
i
[1]j  n   t, from which we conclude that p
i
does not stop at line 08. This establishes the base case r = 1: for all the processes p
i
that do
not commit receive omission failures during the rst round we have p
i
2 Completing[1] and
C  trusted
i
[1].
 Induction step. Let us assume that the lemma is true from the rst round until round r  1.
We show it remains true at round r. First of all, let us notice that any correct process p
j
sends
a message during r. This follows from the induction assumption: as j 2 Completing[r   1]
and j 2 trusted
j
[r   1], p
j
executes the broadcast at line 04 of the round r.
The proof is then the same as the second paragraph of the base step, replacing trusted
`
[0]
(equal to ) by trusted
`
[r   1] that contains (at least) the correct processes (induction as-
sumption) and the pair of round numbers (0; 1) by the pair (r   1; r), respectively.
2
Lemma 1
The next two lemmas show that n  t is a critical threshold related to the number of processes
(1) for a process to become silent or (2) for the process estimates to become smaller or equal to
some value. More explicitly, the rst of these lemmas states that if a process p
x
is not trusted by
\enough" processes (i.e., trusted by less than n   t processes
5
) at the end of a round r   1, then
that process p
x
is not trusted by the processes that complete round r.
Lemma 2 8r  1 : 8x :


fy : y 2 Completing[r 1]^x 2 trusted
y
[r 1]g


< n  t) x 2 Silent[r].
Proof Given a round r   1, let p
x
be a process such that


fy : y 2 Completing[r   1] ^ x 2
trusted
y
[r   1])g


< n   t. Let p
i
2 Completing[r]. We have to show that, after p
i
has executed
line 07, x =2 trusted
i
[r].
 x =2 trusted
i
[r   1] or p
i
does not receive a message from p
x
during round r. In that case,
we have x =2 rec from
i
[r]. It follows from the way p
i
updates its set trusted
i
(line 07) that
x =2 trusted
i
[r].
 x 2 trusted
i
[r   1] and p
i
receives a message from p
x
during round r (i.e. x 2 rec from
i
[r]).
Let us consider the set W
i
(x) computed by p
i
at line 06 during round r. Let us observe that
a process p
j
that does not trust p
x
at the end of round r   1 sends a pair (est
j
; trusted
j
)
such that x =2 trusted
j
. Consequently, due to the lemma assumptions, p
i
receives at most t
(est; trust) messages such that x 2 trust. As t < n=2, we have t < n t, from which it follows
that jfj : j 2 rec from
i
^ x 2 trust
j
gj < n  t. As W
i
(x)  fj : j 2 rec from
i
^ x 2 trust
j
g
(line 06), x is removed from trusted
i
(line 07) and consequently x =2 trusted
i
[r].
5
Equivalently, trusted by at most t processes.
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2Lemma 2
The next lemma shows that if \enough" (i.e., at least n  t) processes have an estimate smaller
than or equal to a value v at the end of a round r   1, then no process p
i
2 Completing[r] has a
value greater than v at the end of r.
Lemma 3 Let v be an arbitrary value. 8r  1 :


fx : est
x
[r  1]  v ^ x 2 Completing[r  1]g



n  t) 8i 2 Completing[r] : est
i
[r]  v.
Proof Let v be a value such that at least n   t processes p
j
are such that est
j
[r   1]  v. Let
p
j
be one of these (at least n   t) processes that belongs to Completing[r] and sends a message
during r. Let us observe that the pair (est
j
; trusted
j
) sent during r by p
j
is such that est
j
 v.
Let p
i
2 Completing[r]. Due to the very denition of Completing[r], p
i
does not stop by
returning ? at line 09, and consequently, jtrusted
i
[r]j  n   t. This implies that the set of est
j
values received by p
i
during round r and used to compute its new estimate (at line 09) contains at
least n   t values. Due to the \majority of correct processes" assumption (n   t > t) and, to the
fact that two majorities always intersect, at least one of these est
j
is such that est
j
 v. The min()
function used by p
i
to update est
i
at line 09 allows concluding that est
i
[r]  v. 2
Lemma 3
Finally, the next lemma states that the sequence of set values EST [0], EST [1],: : : is monotonic
and never increases.
Lemma 4 8r  0 : EST [r + 1]  EST [r].
Proof The lemma follows directly from the fact that, during a round, values can only disappear
because (1) the new value of est
i
computed by a process is the smallest of values it has received,
and (2) some processes may stop sending or receiving messages. 2
Lemma 4
4.2 Central Lemma
The lemma that follows is central to prove the agreement property, namely, at most k distinct values
are decided. Its formulation is early-stopping oriented. Being general, this formulation allows using
the same lemma to prove both the non-early stopping version of the protocol (Theorem 3) and the
early stopping protocol (Theorem 4).
Lemma 5 Let r (1  r  b
t
k
c + 1) be a round such that (1) C  Completing[r   1], and (2)
jEST [r]j > k (let v
m
denote the kth smallest value in EST [r], i.e., the greatest value among the k
smallest values of EST [r]). Let i 2 Completing[r]. We have n k r < jtrusted
i
[r]j ) est
i
[r]  v
m
.
Proof Let us rst consider the case r = 1. As p
i
2 Completing[r] and n   k < jtrusted
i
[r]j, p
i
misses at most k   1 values during the rst round. It follows that est
i
[1]  v
m
.
The rest of the proof addresses the case r  2. To prove the lemma, we prove the contrapositive,
namely est
i
[r] > v
m
) jtrusted
i
[r]j  n  k r. In the following, r and p
i
denote the round number
and the processes introduced in the lemma statement. Let us consider the following set of processes:
P (v; x) = fp
`
: 9x
0
 x such that ` 2 Completing[x
0
] ^ est
`
[x
0
]  vg
where v is a proposed value and x, 0  x  b
t
k
c + 1, a round number. (P (v; x); x > 0 is the set
of processes that have processed a value v
0
 v during some round x
0
 x; P (v; 0) is the set of
processes whose initial value is smaller than or equal to v.)
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Let r  1. We claim k r  jP (v
m
; r   1)j (Claim C1) and P (v
m
; r   1)     trusted
i
[r]
(Claim C2). The lemma follows directly from these claims, as combining C1 and C2 we obtain
k r  jP (v
m
; r   1)j  j  trusted
i
[r]j, from which we conclude that jtrusted
i
[r]j  n  k r.
The proofs of C1 and C2 are based on the following properties (implicitly dened in the context
of the lemma assumptions for r  2):
Property P1: 8 r
0
 r   2 : P (v
m
; r
0
)  Silent[r
0
+ 2],
Property P2: 8 r
0
 r   2 : k  jP (v
m
; r
0
+ 1)  P (v
m
; r
0
)j.
We rst prove P1 and P2, and then prove the two claims.
Property P1: 8 r
0
 r   2 : P (v
m
; r
0
)  Silent[r
0
+ 2].
Proof of P1. Let r
0
 r   2. We consider two cases, namely r
0
< r   2 and r
0
= r   2.
 r
0
< r   2. Let p
x
2 P (v
m
; r
0
). From the denition of the P (v
m
; r
0
) set, there is a round
r
00
 r
0
such that est
x
[r
00
]  v
m
. We claim that, at the end of round r
00
+ 1, at least n   t
processes do not trust p
x
, which allows us to conclude from Lemma 2 that x 2 Silent[r
00
+2].
The fact that Silent[r
00
+ 2]  Silent[r
0
+ 2] completes the proof.
Proof of the Claim. Let p
c
be a correct process that has not decided by the end of round
r  1. Due to the lemma assumptions, such a correct process does exist. In order to obtain a
contradiction, let us suppose that p
c
trusts p
x
at the end of round r
00
+1 (i.e., x 2 trusted
c
[r
00
+
1]). This implies that p
c
receives and processes a message (est
x
; ) from p
x
during round r
00
+1
and, due to the min() function used to compute a new estimate, we have est
c
[r
00
+ 1]  v
m
.
Let us observe that (O1) all the correct processes have started the round r (by assumption),
(O2) a correct process is trusted by every correct process (Lemma 1 and O1) and, (O3) a
correct process p
y
is such that 8d; d
0
: d
0
< d ) est
y
[d]  est
y
[d
0
] (this is because a correct
process always receives and processes a message from itself).
Let p
y
a correct process. As p
y
trusts p
c
at round r
00
+ 2 (Observation O2), p
c
sends an
estimate v  v
m
during round r
00
+ 2 and, due to the min() function used to compute a new
estimate, we have est
y
[r
00
+2]  v
m
. Moreover, until it decides, p
y
is then such that est
y
 v
m
(Observation O3). In particular, at the end of the round r   1, every correct process p
y
is
such that est
y
[r   1]  v
m
.
Moreover, as there are at least n t correct processes that belong to Completing[r 1] (lemma
assumption), it follows from Lemma 3 that all the processes p
y
that belong to Completing[r]
are such that est
y
[r]  v
m
. As p
i
belongs to Completing[r] (lemma assumption) we have
est
i
[r]  v
m
: a contradiction (remind that the proof initially assumes that est
i
[r] > v
m
).
Thus, at the end of round r
00
+1, for each correct process p
c
, x =2 trusted
c
[r
00
+1]. As at least
n  t correct processes belong to Completing[r
00
+1], we conclude that n  t processes do not
trust p
x
at the end of round r
00
+ 1. End of the proof of the Claim.
 r
0
= r   2. Let p
x
2 P (v
m
; r
0
)   P (v
m
; r
0
  1) (if p
x
2 P (v
m
; r
0
  1), the previous case
applies). As i 2 Completing[r] and est
i
[r] > v
m
, taking the contrapositive of Lemma 3 we
obtain jfy : y 2 Completing[r   1] ^ est
y
[r   1]  v
m
gj < n   t. It follows that, even if p
x
sends est
x
[r  2]  v
m
during r  1, strictly less than n  t processes receive and process that
message from p
x
during r   1. This implies that jfy : x 2 trusted
y
[r   1]gj < n   t, from
which we conclude by applying Lemma 2, that x 2 Silent[r].
End of the proof of the property P1.
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Property P2: 8 0  r
0
 r   2 : k  jP (v
m
; r
0
+ 1)  P (v
m
; r
0
)j.
Proof of P2. Let r
0
be a round number, 0  r
0
 r   2 and p
x
2 P (v
m
; r
0
). From property P1, we
know that p
x
2 Silent[r
0
+ 2]. Thus, during r
0
+ 2, any process p
j
2 Completing[r
0
+ 2] (possibly
including p
x
itself) ignore the round r
0
+1 estimate of p
x
(i.e., est
x
[r
0
+1]) to compute est
j
[r
0
+2].
It follows that, if all the processes p
j
such that est
j
[r
0
+ 1]  v
m
were such that p
j
2 P (v
m
; r
0
),
then no value v  v
m
would belong to EST [r
0
+ 2]. This means that the only possibility for such
values to belong to EST [r
0
+ 2], is to be adopted during r
0
+ 1 by some p
y
=2 P (v
m
; r
0
).
As EST [r]  EST [r
0
+ 2] (Lemma 4), and EST [r] contains k values smaller than or equal to
v
m
(lemma assumption), we can conclude that EST [r
0
+ 2] contains at least k values smaller
than or equal to v
m
. It follows that, during round r
0
+ 1, at least k processes p
j
such that
p
j
2 Completing[r
0
+ 1] ^ p
j
=2 P (v
m
; r
0
) adopt an estimate smaller than or equal to v
m
. This
implies that jP (v
m
; r
0
+ 1)  P (v
m
; r
0
)j  k. End of the proof of the property P2.
Claim C1: k r  jP (v
m
; r   1)j.
Proof of C1. The proof is by induction on the round number r
0
.
 Base case r
0
= 1: By assumption, there are k distinct values smaller than or equal to v
m
in
EST [r]. As no new value appears in a round, at least k distinct values smaller than or equal
to v
m
were initially proposed, it follows that k  jP (v
m
; 0)j.
 Induction case: k r
0
 jP (v
m
; r
0
  1)j is satised for 1  r
0
< r.
As k  jP (v
m
; r
0
)  P (v
m
; r
0
  1)j (Property P2) and as P (v
m
; r
0
  1)  P (v
m
; r
0
) (from the
denition of the P (v; x) sets), we have k + jP (v
m
; r
0
  1)j  jP (v
m
; r
0
)j (A).
Combining k(r 1)  jP (v
m
; r 2)j (induction assumption) with A, we obtain k r  jP (v
m
; r 
1)j.
End of the proof of the claim C1.
Claim C2: P (v
m
; r   1)    trusted
i
[r].
Proof of C2. The claim is trivially satised if trusted
i
[r] = ;. In the other case, let us observe that,
as p
i
2 Completing[r], we have Silent[r]   trusted
i
[r] (see the \Notation" section). Combining
this inclusion with P (v
m
; r 2)  Silent[r] (Property P1), we obtain P (v
m
; r 2)   sender
i
[r]
(B).
Due to the property P2, the set P (v
m
; r   1)   P (v
m
; r   2) has at least k elements. Hence,
it is not empty. Let p
x
2 P (v
m
; r   1)   P (v
m
; r   2). We consider two cases. If p
x
does not
send a message to p
i
or p
i
fails to receive the message of p
x
during r, we have x =2 rec from
i
[r]
which implies x 2    trusted
i
[r] (line 07). If p
x
sends a message to p
i
in round r, it sends
v = est
x
[r   1]  v
m
. Due to the min() function used to compute new estimate (line 09) and as p
i
is such that est
i
[r] > v
m
, p
i
does not process v during r. It follows that x 2    trusted
i
[r]. So,
for each process p
x
such that p
x
2 P (v
m
; r  1)  P (v
m
; r  2), we always have x 2   trusted
i
[r]
(C). Combining B and C, we obtain P (v
m
; r  1)    trusted
i
[r] which proves the claim. End of
the proof of the claim C2.
2
Lemma 5
4.3 Properties of the Protocol
Theorem 1 [Validity] A decided value is a proposed value.
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Proof Let us rst observe that a process p
i
decides at line 11 of the last round. It then decides
est
i
[b
t
k
c+ 1].
The proof is an easy induction on the round number. Initially (r = 0), each est
i
local variable
contains a proposed value (line 01). Let us assume this is true until round r   1. We show it is
true at the end of round r. Let us notice that, due to the test of line 08, p
i
updates est
i
at line 09
only if jtrusted
i
j  n  t (otherwise, p
i
stops at line 08 without deciding). Due to line 07, trusted
i
is a set including only processes p
j
whose value est
j
has been received during the current round r.
As that value is the value computed by p
j
during the previous round, it follows from the induction
assumption that est
i
contains a proposed value. 2
Theorem 1
Theorem 2 [Strong Termination] A process p
i
that neither crashes nor commits receive omission
failures decides.
Proof Let p
i
be a good process (so, either p
i
is correct, or commits only send omission failures).
Lemma 1 shows that 8r : C  trusted
i
[r]. We conclude from that lemma that 8r : jtrusted
i
[r]j 
jCj  n  t. It follows that p
i
never exits at line 08. Consequently, p
i
decides at line 11 of the last
round r = b
t
k
c+ 1. 2
Theorem 2
As a correct process does not commit receive omission failures, the following corollary is an
immediate consequence of the previous theorem.
Corollary 1 [Termination] Every correct process decides.
Theorem 3 [Agreement] No more than k dierent values are decided.
Proof Let us consider the set EST [b
t
k
c+1] that contains the estimate values present in the system
at the end of the round b
t
k
c+1. We claim jEST [b
t
k
c+1]j  k (claim C). Due to very denition of
the EST [r] sets, a process that decides decides a value 2 EST [b
t
k
c+ 1]. This implies that at most
k dierent values are decided.
Proof of C. Let t = kx+y with y < k (hence b
t
k
c = x). The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume
that jEST [x+1]j > k. Let v
m
be the kth smallest values in EST [x+1] and let i 2 Completing[x+1]
such that est
i
[x+ 1] > v
m
.
As each correct process decides (Corollary 1), there are at least n   t (correct) processes in
Completing[x + 1]. Moreover, as jEST [x + 1]j > k, the assumptions of Lemma 5 are satised.
Considering our assumption est
i
[x + 1] > v
m
, and applying the contrapositive of Lemma 5 to
process p
i
, we obtain jtrusted
i
[x + 1]j  n   k(x + 1) = n   (kx + k) < n   (kx + y) = n   t.
This implies that p
i
returns ? at line 08 during the round x+1: a contradiction with the fact that
i 2 Completing[x+ 1]. End of the proof of the claim C. 2
Theorem 3
5 A Strongly Terminating and Early Stopping k-Set Agreement
Protocol
This section enriches the previous strongly terminating k-set agreement protocol to obtain an
early stopping protocol, namely, a protocol where a good process decides and halts by round
min(b
f
k
c+ 2; b
t
k
c+ 1), and a bad process executes at most min(d
f
k
e+ 2; b
t
k
c+ 1) rounds.
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The protocol is described in Figure 2. To make reading and understanding easier, all the lines
from the rst protocol appears with the same number. The line number of each of the 10 new lines
that make the protocol early stopping are prexed by \E". We explain here only the new parts of
the protocol.
Function k-set agreement(v
i
)
(01) est
i
 v
i
; trusted
i
 ; can dec
i
 ;; % r = 0 %
(02) for r = 1; : : : ; b
t
k
c+ 1 do
(03) begin round
(04) if (i 2 trusted
i
) then foreach j 2  do send(est
i
; trusted
i
; can dec
i
) to p
j
enddo endif ;
(E01) let REC FROM
i
= fig [ fj : (est
j
; trust
j
; c dec
j
) is received from p
j
during rg;
(E02) let CAN DEC
i
= [(c dec
j
: j 2 REC FROM
i
);
(E03) if (i =2 trusted
i
_ i 2 can dec
i
) then
(E04) if jCAN DEC
i
j > t then let EST
i
= fest
j
: j 2 REC FROM
i
^ c dec
j
6= ;g;
(E05) return (min(EST
i
))
(E06) endif endif ;
(05) let rec from
i
= fj : (est
j
; trust
j
; c dec
j
) is received from p
j
during r ^ j 2 trusted
i
g;
(06) foreach j 2 rec from
i
let W
i
(j) = f` : ` 2 rec from
i
^ j 2 trust
`
g;
(07) trusted
i
 rec from
i
 

j : jW
i
(j)j < n  t
	
;
(08) if (jtrusted
i
j < n  t) then return (?) endif ;
(09) est
i
 min(est
j
received during r and such that j 2 trusted
i
);
(E07) can dec
i
 [(c dec
j
received during r and such that j 2 trusted
i
);
(E08) if (i 2 trusted
i
^ i =2 can dec
i
)
(E09) then if (n  k r < jtrusted
i
j) _ (can dec
i
6= ;) then can dec
i
 can dec
i
[ fig endif
(E10) endif
(10) end round;
(11) return (est
i
)
Figure 2: k-set early-deciding protocol for general omission failures, code for p
i
, t <
n
2
5.1 Additional Local Variables
A process p
i
manages three additional local variables, one (can dec
i
) whose scope is the whole
computation, and two (CAN DEC
i
and REC FROM
i
) whose scope is limited to each round.
Their meaning is the following.
 can dec
i
is a set of process identities that contains, to p
i
's knowledge, all the processes that
can decide a value without violating the agreement property. The current value of can dec
i
is part of each message sent by p
i
. Its initial value is ;.
 REC FROM
i
is used by p
i
to store its id plus the ids of all the processes from which it has
received messages during the current round r (line E01). Dierently from the way rec from
i
is computed (line 05), no ltering (with the set trusted
i
) is used to compute REC FROM
i
.
 CAN DEC
i
is used to store the union of all the can dec
j
sets that p
i
has received during the
current round r (line E02).
5.2 Process Behavior
As already indicated, the behavior of a process p
i
is modied by adding only 10 lines (E01-E10).
It is important to notice that no variable used in the basic protocol is updated by these lines; the
basic protocol variables are only read. This means that, when there is no early deciding/stopping
at line E05, the enriched protocol behaves exactly as the basic protocol.
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Let us now examine the two parts of the protocol where the new statements appear.
 Let us rst consider the lines E07-E10.
After it has updated its current estimate est
i
(line 09), p
i
updates similarly its set can dec
i
,
to learn the processes that can early decide. As we can see, est
i
and can dec
i
constitute a
pair that is sent (line 04) and updated \atomically".
Then, if p
i
trusts itself (i 2 trusted
i
) and, up to now, was not allowed to early decide and
stop (i =2 can dec
i
), it tests a predicate to know if it can early decide. If it can, p
i
adds its
identity to can dec
i
(line E09). The \early decision" predicate is made up of two parts:
{ If can dec
i
6= ;, then p
i
learns that other processes can early decide. Consequently, as it
has received and processed their estimates values (line 09), it can safely adds its identity
to can dec
i
.
{ If n k r < jtrusted
i
j, then p
i
discovers that the set of processes it trusts is \big enough"
for it to conclude that it knows one of the k smallest estimate values currently present
in the system. \Big enough" means here greater than n  k r. (Let us notice that that
threshold was used in Lemma 5 in the proof of the basic protocol.)
 Let us now consider the lines E01-E06.
As already indicated REC FROM
i
and CAN DEC
i
are updated in the receive phase of the
current round.
To use these values to decide during the current round (at line E05), p
i
must either be faulty
(predicate i =2 trusted
i
) or have previously sent its pair (est
i
; can dec
i
) to the other processes
(predicate i =2 trusted
i
_ i 2 can dec
i
evaluated at line E03). But, when i 2 trusted
i
,
i 2 can dec
i
is not a suciently strong predicate for p
i
to safely decide. This is because it is
possible that p
i
committed omission faults just during the current round. So, to allow p
i
to
early decide, we need to be sure that at least one correct process can decide (as it is correct
such a process p
j
can play a \pivot" role sending its (est
j
; can dec
j
) pair to all the processes).
Hence, the intuition for the nal early decision/stopping predicate, namely jCAN DEC
i
j > t
used at line E04: that additional predicate guarantees that at least one correct process can
early decide and consequently has transmitted or will transmit its (est
j
; can dec
j
) pair to all.
So, the early decision/stopping predicate for a process p
i
spans actually two rounds r and r
0
(r
0
> r). This is a \two phase" predicate split as follows:
 During r (lines E08|E09): (i 2 trusted
i
^ i =2 can dec
i
)^ (n k r < jtrusted
i
j)_ (can dec
i
6=
;), and
 During r
0
(lines E03|E04): (i =2 trusted
i
_ i 2 can dec
i
) ^ jCAN DEC
i
j > t.
Moreover, for a correct process p
i
, the assignment can dec
i
 can dec
i
[fig can be interpreted
as a synchronization point separating the time instants when they are evaluated to true.
6 Proof of the Strongly Terminating Early Stopping Protocol
6.1 Basic Lemmas
The next lemma extends Lemma 1 to the early stopping context.
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Lemma 6 Let r
d
be the rst round during which a correct process decides at line E05 (If there is
no such round, let r
d
= b
t
k
c+1). Let p
i
be a process that is correct or commits only send omission
failures. 8r  r
d
: if p
i
does not decide at line E05 of the round r, we have (1) C  trusted
i
[r] and
(2) i 2 Completing[r].
Proof The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 1. It is left to the reader.
2
Lemma 6
Lemma 5 considers a round r such that C  Completing[r   1] (i.e., a round executed by all
the correct processes). Its proof relies on Lemma 1, but considers only the rounds r
0
 r. As,
until a correct process decides, the Lemma 1 and the Lemma 6 are equivalent, it follows that the
Lemma 1 can be replaced by Lemma 6 in the proof of Lemma 5. Let us also observe that the
proofs of the Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are still valid in the early stopping context (these proofs use the
set Completing[r] and do not rely on the set C). We now state and prove additional lemmas used
to prove the early stopping k-set agreement protocol.
Lemma 7 The set EST
i
[r] computed by p
i
during round r (line E04) is not empty.
Proof Let p
i
be a process and r be a round number such that p
i
computes EST
i
during round r. Let
us rst observe that, due to the test of line E04, CAN DEC
i
6= ;. As, from the protocol text (line
E02), CAN DEC
i
=
S
j2REC FROM
i
c dec
j
, it necessarily exists x such that x 2 REC FROM
i
^
c dec
x
6= ;. Moreover, due to the denition of REC FROM
i
[r], x = i or x 6= i. In the rst case,
est
x
= est
i
[r   1] is associated with c dec
x
. In the second case, the estimate est
x
[r   1] sent by
p
x
and received by p
i
during r is associated with c dec
x
. In both case, this estimate belongs to
EST
i
[r] (from the very denition of EST
i
[r] at line E04). 2
Lemma 7
Lemma 8 Assuming that a process decides at line E05 during round r, let p
x
be a process that
proceeds to round r + 1 (if r = b
t
k
c + 1, \proceed to round r + 1" means \execute the return()
statement at line 11"). We have: x =2 trusted
x
[r] _ x 2 can dec
x
[r].
Let us remark that it follows from that lemma that (i) if p
x
executes line E03 during round
r+1, it then evaluates the predicate in the if statement to true. Moreover, (ii) if p
x
sends messages
during round r+1 (which implies that x 2 trusted
x
[r], line 04), these messages necessarily carry a
can dec
x
set that contains x. Proof Let us dene I[r] = fy : 9r
0
y
< r such that y 2 can dec
y
[r
0
y
]g,
where r is the round number dened in the lemma statement. Let p
x
a process that proceeds to
r + 1.
Let p
i
be a process that decides during round r. As p
i
decides at line E05, we have jCAN DEC
i
[r]j >
t. As any process p
j
is the only that can start adding j in a can dec set (line E09), it follows from
the way the CAN DEC sets are computed (lines E01-E02) that at least t + 1 processes p
y
have
executed can dec
y
 can dec
y
[ fyg by the end of round r   1, i.e., jI[r]j > t (E). Moreover, since
p
x
proceeds to round r + 1, jtrusted
x
[r]j  n   t (F)(otherwise, p
x
would return ? at line 08).
By combining E and F, we obtain that 9y 2 I[r] \ trusted
x
[r]. This means that p
x
receives and
processes a message from a process p
y
; y 2 I[r] during round r.
The fact that p
y
sends messages during r implies that p
y
trusts itself at least until the end
of round r   1 (line 04). Consequently, p
y
takes into account the can dec sets it has previously
computed to update can dec
y
during round r   1 (line E07). In particular, as y 2 I[r], y 2
can dec
y
[r
y
]  can dec
y
[r   1]. Since can dec
y
[r   1] is sent by p
y
during r, it follows that p
x
processes a non empty can dec set at line E07. Consequently, if x 2 trusted
x
[r] then, after the
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lines E08-E10 have been executed by p
x
, we necessarily have x 2 can dec
x
[r] and the lemma follows.
2
Lemma 8
Lemma 9 Let i 2 Completing[r] (1  r  b
t
k
c + 1). can dec
i
[r] 6= ; ) est
i
[r] is one of the k
smallest values in EST [r].
Proof can dec
i
[r] 6= ; means that n k r < jtrusted
i
[r]j (line E09), or p
i
has received and processed
a message carrying a non-empty can dec
x
set (line E07). We consider each case separately.
 Case 1: n  k r < jtrusted
i
[r]j and each pair (est
x
; can dec
x
) received and processed (at lines
09 and E07) by p
i
during round r is such that can dec
x
= ;. We claim that, in that case, all
the correct processes start round r (Claim C).
If EST [r]  k, the lemma is trivially correct, so we suppose that EST [r] > k. Thanks to
Claim C, we can conclude that C  Completing[r   1]. We can consequently apply Lemma
5 and the lemma follows.
Proof of the Claim C. We rst establish that (assertion A) 8r
0
< r : i 2 trusted
i
[r
0
] ^
can dec
i
[r
0
] = ;. Let us rst observe that, as p
i
executes can dec
i
 can dec
i
[ fig during
round r (case assumption), i 2 trusted
i
[r] (lines E08-E09). It follows then from the man-
agement of the trusted
i
set (lines 05-07) that (1) 8r
0
< r : i 2 trusted
i
[r
0
]. Moreover, as
i 2 trusted
i
[r],p
i
receives and processes during r the can dec set it has computed during
r   1. Due to the case assumption (i.e., each pair (est
x
; can dec
x
) received and processed by
p
i
during round r is such that can dec
x
= ;), can dec
i
[r   1] = ;. The same reasoning can
be applied at round r   1; : : : ; 1, from which we conclude that (2) 8r
0
< r : can dec
i
[r
0
] = ;.
The assertion follows by combining (1) and (2).
We have to show that C  Completing[r 1]. In order to obtain a contradiction, let us suppose
that it exists a correct process that stops before the end of round r   1. Let r
0
( r   1)
be the rst round during which a correct process stops and let p
j
be a correct process that
stops during r
0
. This means that either p
i
returns ? at line 08 or p
i
decides at line E05.
As no correct process decides before r
0
(by the denition of the round r
0
), it follows from
Lemma 6 that jtrusted
j
[r
0
]j  n   t, from which we conclude that p
j
cannot returns ?
(line 08). Consequently, the only possibility for p
j
to stop during r
0
is to decide at line
E05. But, in that case, as p
i
proceeds to round r
0
+ 1( r) and, due to Lemma 8, we have
i =2 trusted
i
[r
0
] _ i 2 can dec
i
[r
0
]. Since r
0
< r, this contradicts the assertion A. End of the
proof of the Claim C.
 Case 2: p
i
receives and processes a pair (est
x
; can dec
x
) carrying a non-empty can dec
x
set
during round r. So, there is a chain of processes j = j
a
; j
a 1
; : : : ; j
0
= i that has carried a
non-empty can dec set to p
i
. This chain is such that a > 0, n  k(r   a) < jtrusted
j
[r   a]j
is satised, and during round r   x; 0  x  a   1, process j
x
receives and processes the
pair (v
x+1
; can dec
x+1
6= ;) sent by process j
x+1
. As each process in the chain computes the
minimum of the values it has received and processed, v
x+1
 v
x
and v
1
 est
i
[r], where v
1
is
the value received by process j
0
= i from process j
1
during r. Hence, v
a
 v
1
where v
a
is the
value sent by process j
a
at round r   a+ 1. Moreover, at process j = j
a
, when the predicate
n  k(r   a) < jtrusted
j
[r   a]j is satised at round r   a, Case 1 applies. Thus, v
a
is one of
the k smallest value of EST [r   a]. Due to Lemma 4, EST [r]  EST [r   a]. Consequently,
v
a
 est
i
[r] implies that est
i
[r] is one of the k smallest values of EST [r], which proves the
lemma for Case 2.
17
2Lemma 9
Lemma 10 Assuming that a process decides at line E05 during round r, let p
x
be a process that
proceeds to round r + 1 (if r = b
t
k
c + 1, \proceed to round r + 1" means \execute the return()
statement at line 11"). We have: est
x
[r] is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].
Proof Let p
x
be a process that proceeds to round r + 1. Let us observe that the assumptions
stated in this lemma and Lemma 8 are the same. Consequently, by using the proof of Lemma 8,
we have p
x
receives and processes during the round r a pair (est
y
; can dec
y
6= ;) from a process p
y
(this is established in the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 8).
Let us now consider the value est
y
[r   1] sent by p
y
to p
x
during r. As y 2 Completing[r   1]
and can dec
y
[r   1] 6= ;, it follows from Lemma 9 that est
y
[r   1] is among the k smallest values
of EST [r   1]. As est
y
[r   1] is taken into account by p
x
to compute est
x
[r] at line 09, we have
est
x
[r]  est
y
[r   1]. Finally, EST [r]  EST [r   1] (Lemma 4) allows concluding that est
x
[r] is
among the k smallest values in EST [r   1], and the lemma follows. 2
Lemma 10
Lemma 11 Let r  b
t
k
c be the rst round during which a process decides at line E05. Then,
(1) every process that is correct or commits only send omission failures decides at line E05 during
round r or r + 1. Moreover, (2) no process executes more than r + 1 rounds.
Proof We assume that a process decides before the end of round b
t
k
c. Let r be the rst round during
which a process decides. Let DC[r
0
] denotes the set of correct processes that decide at line E05
during round r
0
. Let us notice that, due to the assumption on round number r, 8r
0
< r : DC[r
0
] = ;.
We rst state a claim that follow from the protocol text and the fact a process early decides at r.
Claim C : If a correct process p
c
decides during r then, p
c
sends messages during r that carry a
can dec
c
set such that c 2 can dec
c
.
Proof of the Claim C : As C  Completing[r   1] (i.e., no correct process decide before the end of
round r   1), we can apply Lemma 1 from which we obtain c 2 trusted
c
[r   1]. Hence, p
c
sends
messages (that carry can dec
c
[r 1]) at the beginning of r. Moreover, as p
c
decides at line E05 and,
due to the test of line E03, we necessarily have c 2 can dec
c
[r 1]. End of the Proof of the Claim C.
We now prove the lemma by considering two cases:
 First case: every correct process decides during round r.
Let p
i
be a process that commits only send omission failures and does not decide during
round r. As C  Completing[r   1], it follows from Lemma 6 that C  trusted
i
[r]. This
implies that p
i
cannot returns ? at line 08 and then, proceeds to round r + 1. We now show
that can dec
i
[r]j > t. C  trusted
i
[r] means that p
i
receives and processes a message from
every correct process during r. Consequently, as every correct p
c
sends messages that carry
a can dec set that contains c during round r (Claim C), C  can dec
i
[r] (line E07). Hence,
jcan dec
i
[r]j > t. Let us now consider p
i
during round r+1. Let us rst notice that, as p
i
adds
its identity in the REC FROM
i
[r + 1] set (line E01), C  can dec
i
[r]  CAN DEC
i
[r + 1]
(line E02), which implies that jCAN DEC
i
[r + 1]j > t. Moreover, p
i
evaluates at r + 1 the
predicate of line E03 to true (Lemma 8). As jCAN DEC
i
[r + 1]j > t, p
i
decides a value at
line E05. This proves the rst item of the lemma in the case assumption.
Let now p
i
be a process that commits receive omission failure and does not decide during
round r. Suppose that p
i
does not decide at line E05 during round r+1. Let us remark that,
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as every correct process decides during round r, at most t processes send messages during
round r + 1. It follows that the set rec from
i
[r + 1] computed by p
i
at line 05 contains at
most t process ids, from which we conclude that 8j 2 rec from
i
: jW
i
(j)j  t < n   t (line
06). Therefore, trusted
i
[r+1] = ; and p
i
returns ? at line 08: the second item of the lemma
follows.
 Second case: at least one correct process has not decided at the end of round r.
Let p
i
be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. Let us rst observe
that p
i
proceeds to round r+1. As r is the rst round during which a correct process decides,
it follows from Lemma 6 that C  trusted
i
[r], from which we conclude that p
i
cannot returns
? at line 08 during round r.
We rst show that DC[r]  can dec
i
[r]. Let us consider a correct process p
c
that decides
during round r (i.e., c 2 DC[r]). Due to the claim C, p
c
send a messages during r. Moreover,
as C  trusted
i
[r], p
i
receives and processes the message sent by p
c
during r. Since this
message carries a can dec set such that c 2 can dec (claim C) , p
i
adds c in its can dec
i
set at line E07. This is true for any correct process p
c
that decides during round r, hence
DC[r]  can dec
i
[r].
We now show that p
i
decides at line E05 during round r + 1. As p
i
does not commit send
omission failures, p
i
receives a message during r + 1 from every correct process p
c
that has
not decided during r. Such a message carry a can dec
c
set such that fcg [DC[r]  can dec
c
(the fact that c 2 can dec
c
follows from Lemma 8, as for a correct process p
c
we have
c 2 trusted
c
[r]). Consequently, it follows from lines E01-E02 that C  CAN DEC
i
[r + 1].
Moreover, as p
i
evaluates the local predicate at line E03 to true (Lemma 8), p
i
decides at line
E05.
This proves the item (1) of the lemma. As far as item (2) is concerned, let us now consider a faulty
process p
i
that commits receive omission failure while not crashing. Suppose that p
i
does not early
decide (at line E05) during rounds r and r + 1. We show that p
i
has returned ? by the end of
round r + 1.
In order to establish a contradiction, suppose that p
i
proceeds to round r + 2. As p
i
does
not return ? at line 08, jtrusted
i
[r + 1]j  n   t. As trusted
i
[r + 1]  rec from
i
[r + 1] 
REC FROM
i
[r+1], we have n  t  jREC FROM
i
[r+1]j. This means that p
i
receives messages
from at least n   t processes during round r + 1. Yet, every message sent during r + 1 carries a
can dec set that contains the id of its sender (Lemma 8). Consequently, REC FROM
i
[r + 1] 
CAN DEC
i
[r+1] and then, jCAN DEC
i
[r+1]j > t. Finally, as p
i
evaluates the predicate of line
E03 to true (Lemma 8), p
i
decides at line E05: a contradiction. 2
Lemma 11
6.2 Properties of the Protocol
Theorem 4 [Agreement] No more than k dierent values are decided.
Proof To prove the lemma, we consider two cases according to the rst round r during which a
process decides.
 Case 1: r  b
t
k
c.
In that case, any process that decides decides at line E05 during round r or r + 1 (Lemma
11). We show that any decided value is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].
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Let us rst observe that if a process p
i
decides at line E05 during a round r
0
, there is a process
p
x
such that 9x 2 REC FROM
i
[r
0
] and can dec
x
[r
0
  1] 6= ; (possibly x = i) (G). This
follows from the fact that jCAN DEC
i
[r
0
]j > t and the way CAN DEC sets are computed.
Moreover, the value est
x
[r   1] belongs to EST
i
[r] (by the denition of the EST
i
[r] set).
{ Let p
i
be a process that decides during r.
Let p
x
be a process that satises the assertion G. As p
x
sends messages during r or is p
i
itself (this is because x 2 REC FROM
i
[r]), x 2 Completing[r  1]. Since can dec
x
[r 
1] 6= ;, it follows from Lemma 9 that est
x
[r   1] is among the k smallest values in
EST [r  1] (i). Moreover, est
x
[r  1] 2 EST
i
[r] (ii) and, EST
i
[r]  EST [r  1] (i.e., the
set EST
i
[r] contains only values computed during r 1) (iii). Due to the min() function
used by p
i
to compute the value v that it decides, combining (i), (ii) and (iii) allows
concluding that v is among the k smallest values in EST [r   1].
{ Let us now consider a process p
i
(if any) that decides during round r + 1.
As before, let us consider a process p
x
as dened in assertion G, so we have est
x
[r] 2
EST
i
[r+1]. Since a process has early decided at r and p
x
proceeds to round r+1 (this
is because x = i or, as x 2 REC FROM
i
[r + 1], p
x
necessarily sends a message during
round r+1), assumptions of Lemma 10 are satised. Consequently, est
x
[r] is among the
k smallest values in EST [r   1]. As EST
i
[r + 1]  EST [r] and EST [r]  EST [r   1]
(Lemma 4), we have EST
i
[r + 1]  EST [r   1]. Moreover, as est
x
[r] 2 EST
i
[r + 1], we
can conclude that the value decided by p
i
is among the k smallest ones in EST [r   1].
 Case 2: r = b
t
k
c+ 1. We consider two cases according to lines at which processes decides.
{ At least one process decides at line E05. We show that, in that case, any decided value is
among the k smallest values in EST [r 1](= EST [b
t
k
c]). Let p
i
be a process that decides
at line E05 during round r. The reasoning used in the rst item of Case 1 is still valid.
Consequently, p
i
decides one of the k smallest in EST [r   1]. Let now p
j
be a process
that decides at line 11. As a process decides at line E05 of round r(= b
t
k
c + 1) and p
j
\proceeds to round r+1" (which means here that p
j
executes the return() statement at
line 11), the assumptions of Lemma 10 are satised, from which we conclude that est
j
[r]
is among the k smallest values in EST [r 1]. To conclude, let us observe that p
j
decides
the value est
j
[r].
{ No process decides at line E05. This means that the early decision machinery (i.e., lines
E01-E06 and E08-E10) is useless in the considered execution. Let us observe that, if we
suppress lines E01-E06 and E08-E10 in the protocol of Figure 2, the resulting protocol
is exactly the protocol of Figure 1. Dierently said, while no process decides, for all
process p
i
, the management of variable trust
i
and est
i
does not dier in the protocols of
Figures 1 and 2. This implies that, in the particular execution considered here, we can
safely apply Theorem 3 which states that no more than k distinct values are decided.
2
Theorem 4
Theorem 5 [Strong Termination and Early Stopping] (i) A process that is correct or commits only
send omission failures decides and halts by round min(b
f
k
c+2; b
t
k
c+1). (ii) No process halts after
min(d
f
k
e+ 2; b
t
k
c+ 1) rounds.
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Proof The fact that no process executes more than bt=kc+1 rounds is an immediate consequence
of the code of the protocol executed in a round-based synchronous model. Moreover, let us observe
that the theorem follows directly from Lemma 11 as soon as a process decides at round r such that
r  bf=kc + 1. So, to prove the theorem we consider the case where no process decides during a
round  bf=kc+ 1. Let f = xk + y  t, where 0  y < k. (This means that x = bf=kc.)
Proof of item (i).
Assuming that no no process has decided by round x+1, we have to show that that a process that
is correct or commits only send omission failures decides and halts by round b
f
k
c + 2. To show it,
let us consider the consecutive rounds x+ 1 and x+ 2.
 Round x+ 1.
Let p
i
be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We rst establish
that p
i
proceeds to round x+2. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 6: as, by assumption,
no correct process decides by the end of round x + 1, C  trusted
i
[x + 1] (A). Then, as p
i
does not decides nor crashes during x+ 1, p
i
proceeds to round x+ 2.
We now show that for every process p
i
that is correct or commits only send omission failures:
i 2 trusted
i
[x+ 1] ) i 2 can dec
i
[x + 1] (B). Let us assume that i 2 trusted
i
[x+ 1] and let
us consider p
i
when it executes lines E07-E10. If i 2 can dec
i
[x] then, as i 2 trusted
i
[x+ 1],
we still have i 2 can dec
i
[x + 1] (line E07). If i =2 can dec
i
[x], as i 2 trusted
i
[x + 1], p
i
evaluates the local predicate of line E09. Moreover, as C  trusted
i
[x+ 1] (assertion A), we
have jtrusted
i
[x+ 1]j  n  f = n  (kx+ y) > n  k(x+ 1). Consequently, the predicate is
evaluated by p
i
to true, from which we conclude (line E09) that i 2 can dec
i
[x+ 1].
 Round x+ 2.
Let us rst observe that, due to assertion A, every correct process p
c
is such that c 2
trusted
c
[x + 1]. This implies that p
c
sends messages during x + 2 (line 04). Moreover,
due to the assertion B, these messages carry a can dec
c
set such that c 2 can dec
c
(C). Let
p
i
be a process that is correct or commits only send omission failures. We have to show that
p
i
decides. As p
i
does not commit receive omission failures, it receives from every correct p
c
a can dec
c
set such that c 2 can dec
c
. Consequently, we have C  CAN DEC
i
[x+ 2] (lines
E01-E02) from which we obtain that CAN DEC
i
[x + 2] > t. As p
i
evaluates the predicate
of line E03 to true (assertion B), p
i
decides at line E05. This completes the proof of the rst
item of the theorem.
Proof of item (ii).
To prove the second item of the theorem (namely no process halts after the round d
f
k
e + 2), we
consider two cases. Let us rst consider the case where f = xk + y and y 6= 0. We have then
d
f
k
e+ 2 = x+3. As all the correct processes decide by the end of round x+ 2, the item follows by
Lemma 11. The rest of the proof addresses the second case, i.e., y = 0.
Let us rst observe that assertions A, B and C stated above do not depend on the value of y.
We partition the set of correct processes according to the fact they have or not their id in their
can dec set at the end of round x. Let IC[r] denote the subset of correct processes p
c
such that
c 2 can dec
c
[r] and IC[r], the complementary of IC[r] in C (i.e., IC[r] = C   IC[r]). We claim:
jIC[x]j  t (Claim C1) and, 8i 2 IC[r] : trusted
i
[x] = C (Claim C2).
Proof of the Claim C1. Claim C1 is obtained by contradiction. Suppose that jIC[x]j > t. Let
p
i
2 IC[x]. As no correct process decides by the end of round x+1, it follows from Lemma 6 that p
i
receives during round x+1 a can dec
c
such that c 2 can dec
c
from every process p
c
that belongs to
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IC[x]. Consequently, IC[x]  CAN DEC
i
[x+1] (line E01-E02) and then, t < jCAN DEC
i
[x+1]j.
Moreover, as p
i
2 IC[x] (i.e., i 2 can dec
i
[x]) and p
i
is correct (i.e., i 2 trusted
i
[x]) p
i
evaluates
the predicate of line E03 to true, from which we obtain that p
i
decides at line E05 during x+ 1: a
contradiction. End of the Proof of the Claim C1.
Proof of the Claim C2. Let us consider a process p
i
2 IC[x]. Due to Claim C1), such a process
exists. As p
i
does not add its id in can dec
i
[x] and i 2 trusted
i
[x] (because p
i
is a correct process), p
i
evaluates during round x the predicate of line E09 to false. Therefore, n kx = n f  jtrusted
i
[x]j.
As jCj = n   f , it follows from the fact that C  trusted
i
[x] (assertion A) that C = trusted
i
[x].
End of the Proof of the Claim C2.
We now establish that (when y = 0) 8i 2 Completing[x + 1] : i 2 trusted
i
[x + 1] ) i 2
can dec
i
[x + 1] (B'). This property is true for a process p
i
that is correct or commits only send
omission failure (assertion B). Let us consider a process p
j
that commits receive omission failures.
Let us assume that j 2 trust
j
[x+1]. Due to lines 06-07, it follows that p
j
receives at least n  t sets
trust[x] such that j 2 trust[x]. This implies that p
j
receives and processes at least one trust
c
[x]
set such that j 2 trust
c
[x] from a correct process p
c
. As p
j
is not correct, we necessarily have
C ( trusted
c
[x]. Due to Claim C2, this process p
c
necessarily belongs to IC[r]. Hence, p
j
also
receives from p
c
can dec
c
[x] 6= ; (by denition of IC[r]). Consequently, as j 2 trusted
j
[x + 1], it
follows from lines E08-E10 that we necessarily have j 2 can dec
j
[x+ 1].
We now show that a process p
j
that commits receive omission failure decides or halts by the
end of round x + 2. In order to establish a contradiction, suppose that p
j
proceeds to round
x+ 3(= d
f
k
e+ 3). In particular, p
j
does not return ? at line 08 during round x+ 2, which means
that jtrusted
j
[x + 2]j  n   t. As trusted
j
[x + 2]  REC FROM
j
[x + 2], this implies that p
j
receives at least n  t messages during round x+2. Moreover, let us observe that, due to assertion
B' and the test of line 04, every message sent during x+2 carries a can dec
i
such that i 2 can dec
i
(where p
i
is the sender). It follows that jCAN DEC
j
[x + 2]j  n   t > t (line E01-E02). As p
j
uses trusted
j
[x+ 1] and can dec
j
[x+ 1] when it executes line E03, due to assertion B', the test is
satised. It follows that p
j
decides at line E05 during round x+ 2: a contradiction. 2
Theorem 5
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem.
Corollary 2 [Termination] Every correct process decides.
Theorem 6 [Validity] A decided value is a proposed value.
Proof For the processes that decide at line 11, the proof of Theorem 1 applies. So, let us
consider a process p
i
that decides at line E05. The validity property follows from the fact that
EST
i
[r]  EST [r   1] (the values received by p
i
during a round r have been determined during
the round r   1), and EST
i
[r] 6= ; (Lemma 7). 2
Theorem 6
Theorem 7 [Bit Complexity] Let b be the number of bits required to represent a proposed value.
The bit complexity is upper bounded by O(n(b+ 2n)f=k) per process.
Proof The theorem follows directly from the following observations: (1) at most d
f
k
e rounds are
executed, (2) encoding a set with a bit array, the size of a message sent by a process is b+2n, and
(3) a process that sends a message sends it to all the processes. 2
Theorem 7
22
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